Plaintiffs, a corporation and its president, sought review of the decision of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, a corporation and its president, in plaintiffs’ action for slander, trade libel, and interference with business relationship. If you are looking for corporate lawyer then you are at right place.
Plaintiffs, a corporation and its president, brought an action for slander, trade libel, and interference with business relationship against defendants, a corporation and its president, which alleged that defendant president stated in the presence of others that plaintiff president was a “crook” and a “thief” and that plaintiff corporation was a “scam.” On appeal, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of defendants because the court found that the record established the existence of a material issue of fact, and the possibility that plaintiffs could be able to prove their case at trial. The court determined that a second declaration made by a witness, in which the witness altered his original declaration that defendant president made no statement whatsoever, precluded a finding that there were no triable issues. The second declaration of the witness, who was present at the meeting where the alleged slanderous comment was made, at least implied that some comment was made by defendant president that a fact finder could reasonably have interpreted to be the slanderous comment alleged by plaintiffs.
The court reversed the trial court judgment, which granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, a corporation and its president, because the conflicting declarations of a witness created a material, triable issue of fact as to whether defendant president made slanderous statements about plaintiffs, a corporation and its president.
Appellant property owners challenged a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which affirmed administrative decisions in appellee municipality’s action to abate a public nuisance. Appellants contended that their due process rights were violated because they were not allowed to cross-examine and subpoena witnesses, and testimony under oath was not required before appellants were deprived of property rights.
Appellant property owners challenged a trial court judgment that affirmed an administrative decision in an action to abate a public nuisance. Appellants contended that appellee municipality’s board of zoning appeals violated their due process rights by depriving them of property rights with a judicial-type hearing. Appellee directed that all ostriches and emus must be removed from appellants’ farm located in a gated community. Appellee affirmed the findings of the zoning administrator, but modified his decision, which required a reduction in the number of birds to 195. Appellants argued that their due process rights were violated because they were not allowed to cross-examine and subpoena witnesses, and testimony under oath was not required. The appellate court held that the informality of administrative hearings, including the lack of an oath, was an important aspect of the decisionmaking process. The court reversed appellee’s decision reducing the number of birds to zero, but affirmed the decision of the zoning administrator because under the municipal nuisance abatement ordinance only the zoning administrator was empowered to authorize discontinuance of a use.
The judgment was reversed because appellee board of zoning appeals abused its discretion in ordering that appellant property owners’ bird farming activities be completely discontinued because only appellee’s zoning administrator may require the discontinuance of a use. A use could not be discontinued unless prior governmental efforts to cause the owner or lessee to eliminate the problems associated with the premises have failed.