HOLDINGS: [1]-A hospital failed to provide notice and hearing under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 809, when it told a physician’s third-party employer that it would not approve a schedule on which the physician was included, which was the functional equivalent of restricting the physician’s privileges under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 805, subd. (a)(4), (5), and thus required peer review proceedings; [2]-Delegating peer review duties to the third-party employer was impermissible because Bus. & Prof. Code, § 809.05, committed those duties to the hospital’s medical staff and Bus. & Prof. Code, § 809.6, prohibited waiver; [3]-The physician’s damages properly included lost earnings and a tax neutralization amount; [4]-Denying attorney fees was not error because the hospital’s defense was not frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 809.9.  Ask business formation attorney for more details.

Judgment affirmed.

Appellant attorney sought review of judgment by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) granting respondent corporation’s motion for a preliminary injunction, contending that the terms of the court’s injunction were overly vague, impermissibly intruded upon her practice of law, and were based on an unenforceable covenant not to compete.

Appellant, a labor law attorney, joined respondent corporation, which engaged in labor relations. After respondent incorporated, appellant’s former employer sold respondent all of its accounts and retained respondent as an independent consultant. Appellant signed an agreement with a buyer’s covenant. Appellant left respondent’s employ. The court below granted respondent a preliminary injunction prohibiting appellant from several activities. The court held that the anti-solicitation covenant was not invalid or unenforceable as a matter of law because respondent had a right to protect against appellant trying to obtain the clients for herself. However, the covenant not to compete could not be applied to restrict appellant’s right to provide legal services in the labor relations field which could not be performed by respondent without a license to practice law in the state because appellant and respondent could not compete in such activities, and the injunction was vague and overly broad.

The court reversed and remanded the superior court’s order, holding that the injunction prevented the attorney from performing activities with which respondent could not compete.